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BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING: LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE  
OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Samuel D. Hodge, Jr.1  
There was of course no way of knowing whether you 
were being watched at any given moment. 
- George Orwell, 1984 
 
“Big brother is watching” is a phrase coined by George Orwell in   his 
novel 1984. This saying describes the government’s surveillance of its 
citizens with electronic listening devices and cameras in a jurisdiction 
where Big Brother is the head of a totalitarian administration.2 The phrase 
depicts an attitude in which no one is beyond the reach of a prying 
government that uses digital cameras with facial recognition software and 
may result in the incarceration of anyone who opposes the regime.3  
Penned by Orwell in 1947, the fictionalization was meant to provide a 
forum to discuss “surveillance, police states and authoritarianism.”4 More 
than seventy years later, the book has proven to be prophetic. The same 
technological breakthroughs that have changed our lives have also 
produced detailed records of our daily lives.5  
To protect society against the dangers presented by terrorism, the 
government has demonstrated a profound desire to secure as much data 
as possible and to utilize that digital information for a variety of 
purposes.6 This article will examine some of the innovations used by law 
enforcement for observation and identification purposes, such as video 
surveillance, drones, automated license plate readers, and facial 
recognition software.  Though each tool is different, the legal issues 
 
 1. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. is an award winning professor at Temple University where he teaches 
law, anatomy and forensics. He is also a member of the Dispute Resolution Institute where he serves 
as a mediator and neutral arbitrator. He is one of the most published scholars in medical/legal matters 
and has authored more than 180 articles in medical and legal journals and has written ten texts 
including The Forensic Autopsy. He also enjoys an AV preeminent rating and has been named a top 
lawyer in Pennsylvania on multiple occasions. The author wishes to thank Nallely Barbosa, a recent 
graduate of the Temple University Beasley School of Law and a teaching assistant for Professor 
Hodge, for her invaluable research and editorial assistance. 
 2. Big Brother is Watching You, LITERARY DEVICES, https://literarydevices.net/big-brother-is-
watching-you/ Z (last visited Nov. 28, 2019). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Matthew Feeney, Seventy Years Later, It’s Still ‘1984’, CATO INSTITUTE (JUNE 5, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/seventy-years-later-its-still-
1984?gclid=Cj0KCQiA2vjuBRCqARIsAJL5a-
KKoOpz0zDd5WcM2avykIIvE_pz4qeeI05VB_hPCBIgAaF7thCii1waAtgaEALw_wcB.    
 5. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1934 (2013). 
 6. Id. 
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involving the various forms of digital technology are relatively similar. 
I. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
Members of society are observed through surveillance equipment in 
many settings such as the streets, banks, casinos, stores, and shopping 
malls.7 Routine monitoring takes place as we drive a vehicle or walk along 
a sidewalk, thereby offering a comprehensive picture of our private lives.8 
Roughly three-quarters of small businesses record those who enter their 
premises9 and closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems even allow law 
enforcement officials to detect, prevent, and investigate assaults and to 
discover crimes against property.10  
The first use of cameras for surveillance purposes occurred in England 
in 1986 where the equipment was installed in a one-square-mile area in 
the town of King’s Lynn.11 Today, England is the worldwide leading user 
of closed-circuit monitoring systems with one-half million cameras in its 
network. Several years later, a few cities in the United States, such as 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, followed England’s lead and 
started installing surveillance cameras in public areas.12 For instance, 
Chicago maintains about 3,700 surveillance cameras and has access to 
more than 32,000 others which can be monitored at police districts, public 
safety headquarters, and other law enforcement locations.13 The City also 
utilizes cameras on police and fire boats, helicopters, SUVs, trailers, and 
command vehicles.14 Nationally, the use of surveillance equipment is 
even more dramatic. Approximately 30 million cameras are employed in 
the United States filming 4 billion hours of footage a week. Needless to 
say, Big Brother is watching almost everywhere and most of the time.15 
 
 7. JERRY RATCIFFE, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF PUBLIC PLACES (Center for Problem-Oriented 
Policing, Response Guide No. 4, 2006), available at https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/video-
surveillance-public-places-0.  
 8. Amanda Li, Top 8 Pros and Cons of Surveillance Cameras in Public Places, REOLINK (Aug. 
28, 2019), https://reolink.com/pros-cons-of-surveillance-cameras-in-public-places/. 
 9. Ratciffe, supra note 7.  
 10. Qasim Mahmood Rajpoot & Christian Damsgaard Jensen, Video Surveillance: Privacy Issues 
and Legal Compliance, DTU (2015), 
https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/110934780/Video_Surveillance_Privacy_issues_
and_legal_compliance.pdf. 
 11. Cristen Conger, Do Police Cameras Reduce Crime, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/police-camera-crime.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Scott Goldfine, 32K Surveillance Cameras Aim to Keep Chicago Safe, CAMPUS SAFETY (Oct. 
31, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/technology/surveillance-cameras-keeping-
chicago-safe/. 
 14. Id. 
 15. James Vlahos, Surveillance Society: New High-Tech Cameras Are Watching You, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009), https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a2398/4236865/. 
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This surveillance will only increase as the price of equipment falls, 
making it feasible to assemble a heretofore unimaginable quantity and 
quality of data.16 The bottom line is that society is moving towards an 
environment in which a person’s every move and transaction is recorded 
by a computer or system.17  
These recorded observations are not limited to police use. Consumer 
spending for home surveillance equipment, such as doorbell cameras, will 
grow into a $9.7 billion industry by 2023.18 This development has 
resulted in private outdoor cameras on homes becoming an emergent law 
enforcement tool.19 For example, 400 police departments have partnered 
with one doorbell camera company to gain access to its footage to assist 
in solving home thefts, vehicle break-ins, and other crimes.20 The 
widespread use of such equipment has also made it standard police 
practice to search for video cameras in the area of a reported crime, 
making them important tools for fighting criminality and gradually 
supplanting neighborhood watch groups and its legion of invisible street 
guardians.21 
A. Video Surveillance Equipment 
Video surveillance equipment consists of a camera that is usually 
hooked up to a recording device or IP network. This video data is then 
arranged into a searchable database through biometric software, thereby 
making the viewing process more efficient for law enforcement 
purposes.22 The cameras can also be armed with motion-detecting 
sensors, which vastly diminish the amount of data and further enhance the 
efficiency of the viewing task.23 The equipment is now so sophisticated 
that cameras permit users to take advantage of “satellite-based optics” that 
allow the observer to see in the dark, visualize words on a page hundreds 
 
  16. Id. 
  17. Id. 
  18. T.J. McCue, Home Security Cameras Market to Surpass $9.7 Billion By 2023, FORBES 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2019/01/31/home-security-cameras-market-
to-surpass-9-7-billion-by-2023/#3f3bea523c2b. 
  19. Watchful Help or Harm?: Police Access Home Surveillance Cameras To Solve Crimes, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sep. 30, 2019), https://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/editorials/2019/09/30/Home-surveillance-cameras-Ring-Amazon-
police/stories/201909280013. 
  20. Id.  
  21. Faith Karimi, Home Surveillance Cameras Are The New Neighborhood Watch, CNN (Aug. 
31, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/30/us/home-surveillance-cameras-neighborhood-
watch/index.html. 
22.  Jack Giordano, VIDEO EVIDENCE: LEGAL STANDARDS & PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (2017), 
available at 2017 WL 6944772. 
 23. Id. 
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of feet away, and look into buildings.24 
B.  Benefits of Surveillance Cameras 
Surveillance cameras in public places have the benefit of identifying 
the perpetrator of a crime.25 The Boston Marathon bombing provides an 
example. The government was able to release images of the two suspects  
from a surveillance camera installed on the outside wall of a department 
store just three days after the attack.26 The technology can also provide a 
feeling of enhanced safety. The cameras can visualize a large area or focus 
on a specific location known for criminal activity. The technology  may 
even act as a deterrent in stopping an offense if the criminal knows that a 
camera is filming the location.27 The footage can also protect the innocent 
by preventing the police from identifying and arresting the wrong 
individual.  
In a legal setting, the footage provides a very strong piece of evidence 
since it is nearly impossible to maintain that a suspect captured on an 
image is not the perpetrator of the crime.28  Surveillance cameras can also 
prevent fraud and made-up stories. For example, a video recording of an 
alleged crime or motor vehicle accident can easily disprove a fraudulent 
claim, thereby freeing up valuable investigative time.29 
C. Criticisms of Surveillance Cameras 
A variety of challenges have attacked the use of video surveillance 
systems, including concerns about the databases that store the video 
footage, the failure to enact standards regulating the retention and use of 
the data collected, and the risk for geolocation tracking without necessary 
oversight.30 Unfortunately, there is a paucity of laws on the use of 
surveillance cameras in public places, and only a small number of 
jurisdictions have enacted legislation to regulate these activities. New 
York’s statute, for example,  provides that law enforcement officials may 
only use this technology as part of an investigation of suspected criminals 
after obtaining a warrant from the court.31  
 
 24. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and The Right 
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 220 (2002).  
 25. Li, supra note 8. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Security Cameras in Public Places: A Good or Bad Thing?, TITAN ALARM (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://titanalarm.com/security-cameras-in-public-places-a-good-or-bad-thing/. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Kimberly Winbush, Annotation, Use of License Plate Readers, 32 A.L.R.7th Art. 8, § 2 (2017). 
 31. Li, supra note 8. 
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Surprisingly, the widespread employment of video cameras has not 
reduced crime and its use is not embraced by all people.32  For instance, 
one study revealed that closed-circuit camera systems did not generate 
“enough bang for the buck.”33 While Federal and state governments have 
spent millions to install and maintain these systems, the study 
demonstrated that the equipment was underemployed and not properly 
assimilated into police strategies.34 
Another major criticism of video surveillance is its potential for abuse 
by law enforcement. A story in the Detroit Free Press supports this 
concern, revealing that law enforcement officials in Michigan used the 
equipment to assist both themselves and their friends stalk females, 
threaten motorists after traffic incidents, and track former spouses or 
partners.35 The technology also raises privacy concerns, since 
advancements in surveillance equipment often outpace changes in the law 
regulating new developments.36  
While Society is indeed exposed to serious security challenges, placing 
cameras in public areas is not universally accepted as a method of 
safeguarding the public. Cameras in public areas will inevitably film 
innocent individuals who have no intention of committing a crime and 
some feel that this constitutes an invasion of privacy.37 Some would rather 
preserve their privacy than feel that “Big Brother” is watching their every 
move.38 
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against unreasonable 
search and seizure, and additional safeguards are derived from legislation 
and case law.39 However, it may take years before the courts or 
legislatures address the thorny issues raised by privacy concerns, as new 
developments in video technology continue to develop on a rapid and 
regular basis.40 Questions are also expressed about how the footage is 
being stored and protected, who has access to the images, under what 
circumstances can it be retrieved, and whether it can be coupled with other 
 
 32. What's Wrong With Public Video Surveillance?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/whats-
wrong-public-video-surveillance (last visited Nov. 28, 2019). 
 33. Conger, supra note 11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. In 1998, a police lieutenant From D.C. Was Criminally Charged For “Extorting Money 
from Customers of a Gay Bar.” The Evidence Revealed That He Wrote Down the License Plate 
Numbers of Those Visiting the Bar and Bribed Them into Paying Him Money by Threatening “To 
Expose Their Lifestyle.” Lauren Fash, Comment, Automated License Plate Readers: The Difficult 
Balance of Solving Crime and Protecting Individual Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2019). 
 36. Allyssa Nielson, Video Surveillance Threatens Privacy, Experts Say, DAILY UNIVERSE (June 
28, 2017), https://universe.byu.edu/2017/06/28/video-surveillance-threatens-privacy/.  
 37. Security Cameras in Public Places: A Good or Bad Thing?, supra note 27. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Nielson, supra note 36. 
 40. Id. 
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materials to create a profile of a person.41 
D. Video Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment  
 Video surveillance is one of the most intrusive types of searches 
performed by the government,42 and the courts will consider the 
expectations of society when measuring its constitutionality.43 One court 
indeed observed that “[t]his type of surveillance provokes an immediate 
negative visceral reaction: indiscriminate video surveillance raises the 
specter of the Orwellian state.”44  
Generally speaking, the courts have not deemed video surveillance of 
a public area to be a search since the person being observed fails to have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.45 State v. Augafa provides an 
example in which the court found that video surveillance of a public area 
is not an invasion of privacy, nor is it a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure.46 In Augafa, the 
defendant was filmed selling drugs on a public sidewalk. Since this illegal 
activity was observed in “open view,” no reasonable expectation of 
privacy was applicable, and the surveillance was not within the ambit of 
the Constitution.47 The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii noted 
that a privacy test requires the court to decide “whether a person's 
expectation of privacy under any particular set of circumstances may be 
deemed reasonable.”48 A violation of the Fourth Amendment only occurs 
when it can be shown that an actual, subjective expectation of privacy is 
present, and that the expectation is one that society acknowledges as being 
objectively reasonable.49  
In another case, a federal district court found that the installation of two 
video cameras by the police—one on a pole outside an apartment building 
and one in a hallway—is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.50  As 
noted: “The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”51 This guarantee is linked to the notion of a 
common law trespass and considers whether the police secured 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. United States v. Cuevas–Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1987).  
 43. Id. at 251. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).   
 46. State v. Augafa, 992 P.2d 723, 725 (Haw. Ct. App.1999). 
 47. Id. at 734. 
 48. Id. at 733. 
 49. Id. 
 50. United States v. Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 721, 727 (E.D. Wis. 2019). 
 51. Id. at 726. 
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information by physically intruding upon a constitutionally 
protected area.52 This concept was later transformed into one that protects 
people and their reasonable expectation of privacy.53 In this regard, the 
court held that a tenant does not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the common areas of an apartment building.54 
Several courts have considered whether long-term video 
surveillance of a house from a pole camera constitutes a “search” under 
the Fourth Amendment.55 These courts have generally found that such a 
practice is constitutional because “a pole camera only captures events that 
a police officer or utility worker situated on the pole could see.”56 The 
decisions have found that extended police observation from a pole camera 
is deemed irrelevant to their “search” analysis.57 For example, in U.S v. 
Houston, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that video surveillance 
performed over ten weeks from a utility pole 200 yards away from a 
property did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the camera recorded the same view that a passerby would have 
from the street.58  Since government agents could have been positioned 
24-hours a day to watch the property, the fact that a camera was used to 
conduct the surveillance fails to make it unconstitutional.59 
A contrary result was reached in People v. Tafoya, where a Colorado 
appellate court found it unconstitutional for the police to have placed a 
video camera on a pole near the defendant’s house to surveil it over a 
lengthy period.60 This camera continually observed the property, 
including an area behind the owner’s fence, for more than three 
months.61 Based on these prolonged observations, the police obtained a 
warrant to search the defendant’s property where they found a cache of 
drugs.62   
 The court acknowledged that it would have been permissible for 
an officer to climb to the top of the utility pole and look over the 
defendant’s fence with binoculars or with a telescopic camera. However, 
it was improper to install a video camera that allowed the police to 
perform continuous surveillance of the property, including the space 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 727. 
 55. People v. Tafoya, No. 17CA1243, 2019 Colo. App. LEXIS 1799, at *13 (Colo. App. Nov. 27, 
2019).  
 56. Id. at *12-13.   
 57. Id. at *13-14.  
 58. United States  v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282 (6thCir.2016). 
 59. Id. at 288. 
 60. Tafoya, 2019 Colo App. LEXIS 1799, at *25-26.  
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. at *1-2. 
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behind the owner’s privacy fence, from the police station for more than 
three months.63 The court opined that “unfettered use 
of surveillance technology could fundamentally alter the relationship 
between our government and its citizens.”64 This type of conduct, the 
court determined, is inconsistent with an open and free society.65 
A more difficult Fourth Amendment determination occurs when video 
surveillance is conducted in a private setting. The following two cases 
illustrate the problem. In Hernadez v. Hillsides, Inc., an employer was 
found not to have committed tortious invasion of privacy when it set up a 
hidden camera in the office of two employees to ascertain who was 
viewing pornographic websites at night in a residential facility for abused 
and neglected children.66  The California Supreme Court determined that 
while a jury could conclude that the employer intruded upon the workers’ 
reasonable privacy expectations, the intrusion was not highly offensive or 
egregious enough to violate prevailing social norms. Activation of the 
video system was restricted to the night when the plaintiffs were 
working.67 
A contrary result was reached in Carter v. County of Los Angeles where 
a hidden camera was placed in a fake smoke detector.68   A report had 
been made that one of the Department of Public Works’ employees had 
engaged in a sexual act with a visitor in the dispatch room.69 A hidden 
camera installed in that area captured inappropriate conduct by several 
employees with visitors.70 The plaintiffs eventually discovered the camera 
and claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure were violated by the secret recordings.71 A federal 
district court agreed and noted that the employees’ belief that “they were 
free from video surveillance was reasonable.”72 They worked in a secure, 
private, and often solitary room that was used for work and off-duty 
activities like eating and napping.73  While employers have many tools 
available to investigate allegations of worker wrongdoing, covert 
video surveillance is not one of them.74 
 
 63. Id. at *25-26. 
 64. Id. at *15.  
 65. Id. at *16.  
 66. Hernadez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Cal. 2009). 
 67. Id. at 1082. 
 68. Carter v. County of L.A., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (C. D. Cal. 2011). 
 69. Id. at 1045-46. 
 70. Id. at 1046.  
 71. Id. at 1047. 
 72. Id. at 1049. 
 73. Id. at 1047. 
 74. Id. at 1050. 
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II. AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS   
The automated license plate reader (“ALPR”) is the most employed 
law enforcement surveillance tool.75 The system consists of high-speed 
cameras that photograph each license plate that passes by the devices76 
and operates on infrared and visual light spectrums so that the plates can 
be read at all times.77 These readers can be placed anywhere from police 
vehicles to stationary objects like poles, traffic lights, and overpasses.78 
As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Hawkins: 
A license-plate reader is a computer-controlled camera system installed in 
some law-enforcement vehicles. The cameras, which are mounted to the 
trunk of the vehicle, capture images of the license plates of cars nearby. 
The system beeps to alert the officer that a plate has been captured, and an 
image of the plate is displayed on the computer's screen.79 
ALPRs can image about 2,000 license plates per minute on vehicles 
going about 120 miles per hour.80 Apps are even available that permit beat 
cops to scan license plates with their smartphones.81 In turn, the images 
are transmitted and analyzed by a computer that identifies the owner of 
the vehicle, affixes a time and location stamp, and uploads the images to 
a central server.82  
A.  Police Use of ALPRs 
ALPRs permit law enforcement to identify and record a vehicle’s 
whereabouts in real-time and determine its prior locations.83 Generally, 
the system will compare each license plate number against “hotlists” to 
sound an instant warning when a match or “hit” appears.84 It can also 
 
 75. Dave Maass, The Four Flavors of Automated License Plate Reader Technology, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/04/four-flavors-automated-
license-plate-reader-technology. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kelsey D. Atherton, License Plate Readers Are Photographing You Everywhere, POPULAR 
SCI. (June 27, 2013), https://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-06/license-plate-readers-
automatically-create-big-data/. 
 78. You Are Being Tracked, ACLU 4 (July 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-
alprreport-opt-v05.pdf. 
 79. State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St. 3d 94, 95, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577. 
 80. Justin Rohrlich, In Just Two Years, 9,000 of These Cameras Were Installed to Spy on Your 
Car, QUARTZ (Feb. 5, 2019), https://qz.com/1540488/in-just-two-years-9000-of-these-cameras-
were-installed-to-spy-on-your-car/. 
 81. You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used To Record Americans’ 
Movements, supra note 78, at 4. 
 82. Maass,  supra note 75. 
 83. Id. 
 84. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 2. 
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retrieve vast amounts of information from the National Crime 
Information Center on vehicles and license plates, which in turn can 
identify wanted persons, protection from abuse orders, missing persons, 
gangs, suspected terrorists, and immigration violators.85   Other 
applications include the ability to verify witness descriptions of vehicles 
and identify cars that were near a specific site.86 In turn, this data can be 
stored for weeks, months, or years.87 Notably, 
most license plate numbers imaged by these systems do not match stolen 
vehicle lists and have no apparent link to any crimes, AMBER alerts, or 
warrants.88 Studies estimate that the number of license plate scans linked 
to a crime is only around 0.2 percent.89 
B. Legal Issues with ALPRs 
The use of ALPRs creates legal issues because the data is stored on a 
computer that is often linked with regional sharing systems, thereby 
creating huge databases of driver location information. This information 
is frequently retained and shared with others with few restrictions on how 
it can be used.90 Critics maintain that this technology presents major 
privacy and “other civil liberties threats.”91  
The Fourth Amendment and its interpretation by the courts controls 
how government officials can accumulate data obtained by ALPRs.92 The 
litmus test for what constitutes an unlawful search was established by the 
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States where the Court stated “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”93  
The harm caused by one scan seems minuscule.94 The rub is that the 
 
 85. Julia M. Brooks, Drawing the Lines: Regulation of Automatic License Plate Readers in 
Virginia, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 2019, at P3. 
 86. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Automated License Plate Readers (2016), available 
at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-4-28_ALPR-Primer_Final.pdf. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Superior Court, 400 P.3d 432, 435 (Cal. 2017).  
 89. Stephanie Foster, Should the Use of Automated License Plate Readers Constitute A Search 
After Carpenter v. United States?, 97 WASH. U. L. Rev. 221, 226-27 (2019). 
 90. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 86. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Scott Bomboy, Police Photos of Your License Plates and the Fourth Amendment, YAHOO! NEWS 
(July 19, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/police-photos-license-plates-fourth-amendment-
132009696.html?guccounter=1. 
 93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 94. Michael Fisher, Ohio Is Jonesing for Automatic License Plate Readers: Why This May Violate 
Your Fourth Amendment Rights and What the Ohio Legislature Should Do About It, 64 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 329, 330 (2016). 
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use of cameras coupled with the widespread sharing of that information 
provides law enforcement with the ability to put together the separate 
puzzle pieces of where people have been into a single, high-resolution 
snapshot of their lives.95 Studies of jurisdictions that utilize license plate 
recognition systems show that Fourth Amendment concerns are not out 
of line. One study revealed that for every one million license plates 
scanned in Maryland during one year, only forty-seven were theoretically 
related to “serious crimes.”96  Even though many states have the same low 
hit rate, law enforcement still collects and stores the data associated with 
these non-hit scans.97 Therefore, license plate reader databases provide 
the opportunity for institutionalized abuse by allowing anyone who has 
access to the information to snoop into an individual’s daily activities, 
habits, or present and past relationships.98  
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation maintain that these systems permit local, state, and federal 
agencies to follow the habits and locations of innocent individuals. They 
further assert that this data gathering constitutes an invasion of privacy 
and may be utilized to manipulate or exploit citizens if the surveillance 
data lands in the wrong hands.99 ALPRs can also be utilized for 
discriminatory targeting. A law enforcement official who manually 
inserts information on a biased basis can check more license plates of a 
particular ethnic or racial group than he or she would without the 
technology.100 
C. Court Decisions involving ALPRs 
No reported decision exits on the validity of protracted location 
tracking using an ALPR. However, there are several federal and state 
court opinions that have determined that single-instance database checks 
of license plate numbers do not qualify as searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.101 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 
U.S. v. Diaz Castaneda that a license plate check was not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.102 In this case, the police officer did not have any 
reason to conduct the license plate check. Nevertheless, the court noted 
that individuals do not enjoy a subjective expectation of privacy in their 
 
 95. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 2. 
 96. Fisher, supra note 94, at 331. 
 97. Id. 
 98. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 2. 
 99. Things to Know About Automatic License Plate Readers, PHYS.ORG (Sep. 15, 2015), 
https://phys.org/news/2015-09-automatic-plate-readers.html.  
100. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 9. 
101. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 86. 
102. United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9thCir. 2007). 
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license plates, and even if they did, the court concluded that society would 
not recognize this belief as reasonable.103  License plates are visible on a 
car’s exterior for anyone to see and are intended to provide information 
about a vehicle to the police and others.104 It is not reasonable for a person 
to believe that his expectation of privacy has been breached when an 
officer sees what is visible and uses that information to check the status 
of the vehicle and its registered owner.105  
A chink in the armor occurred in Neal v. Fairfax County Police 
Department when the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to decide 
whether “the retention of information gathered and stored by a 
police department using an automated license plate reader” violated the 
state’s Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act.106 
This law is designed to “ensure safeguards for personal privacy by 
government agencies.”107 The plaintiff maintained that the police 
department’s use of license plate readers violated the provision that 
information should not be gathered “unless the need for it has been clearly 
established in advance” of collecting that data.108 
Initially, the court noted that a license plate number by itself is merely 
a mixture of letters and numbers “that [do] not describe, locate or index 
anything about anyone.”109 However, the images and data linked to each 
plate represent “personal information” as defined by the statute.110 The 
pictures reveal not only the plate’s number but the vehicle and the 
surrounding area. This data coupled with the GPS location, time, and date 
when the images were filmed “afford a basis for inferring personal 
characteristics, such as . . . things done by or to the individual who owns 
the vehicle, as well as a basis for inferring the presence of the individual 
who owns the vehicle in a certain location at a certain time.”111 Therefore, 
it was logical to infer that the image and related data is “personal 
information” as contemplated by “the legislature’s intent to remedy the 
potential mischief posed by the extensive collection, maintenance, use 
and dissemination of personal information and the potential for misuse of 
such information.”112 The court remanded the case for further action 
 
103. Id. at 1151. 
104. Id. 
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106. Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dept, 812 S.E.2d 444, 445 (Va. 2018). 
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109. Id. at 346. 
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111. Id. at 346-47. 
112. Id. at 347. See also United States. v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th 
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consistent with its decision.113  
One year later, the Circuit Court of Virginia reconsidered the issue.114  
While the ALPR record-keeping procedure does not per se "identify 
particulars" of a vehicle owner, it does permit law enforcement to link the 
information with the identity of an individual.115 “In other words, access 
to the license plate number stored in the ALPR system ‘permit[s] 
connection’ to the identity of the vehicle's owner with a few clicks on the 
screen, all from the driver's seat of a police cruiser.”116 Therefore, the 
ALPR record-keeping process is a "passive use" as defined by the Data 
Act and a violation of the statute.117 The court granted the plaintiff’s 
request for an injunction barring law enforcement officials from 
photographing and storing random license plate data unless the plate was 
scanned according to “investigations of suspected criminal activity.”118 
This decision has been hailed as a victory for data privacy rights 
advocates in their battle over the utilization of digital technologies by the 
police and other government officials.119  
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,120 sixteen 
states have enacted statutes on ALPRs: Arkansas,121 California,122 
Colorado,123 Florida,124 Georgia,125 Maine,126 Maryland,127 Minnesota,128 
 
Sparks, 37 Fed. Appx. 826, (8th Cir. 2002); and Hallstein v. City of Hermosa Beach, 87 Fed. Appx. 
17 (9th Cir. 2003).  
113. Id. at 350. 
114. Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep’t, Case No. CL-2015-5902, Letter Opinion, Judge Robert J. 
Smith (Apr. 1, 2019), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5805797/Opinion-
190401-Alpr-Petition-Granted.pdf. 
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Montana,129 Nebraska,130 New Hampshire,131 North Carolina,132 
Oklahoma,133 Tennessee,134 Utah135 and Vermont.136 The specifics of 
these laws differ depending upon the jurisdiction and objective of the 
state.  
Maine and New Hampshire have the most restrictive laws concerning 
the use of ALPR systems.137 For example, New Hampshire’s law 
prohibits the use of ALPR cameras and other systems that can determine 
“the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle's 
occupants on the public ways of the state.”138  However, cameras are 
allowed for use in the operation of a toll collection system and when 
related to the monitoring of a structure under the control of the state. 
Arkansas follows a less restrictive approach, which disallows the use 
of license plate cameras by public and private agencies but permits the 
system to be employed by the police for ongoing investigations, by 
parking enforcement entities, or for regulating access to secured 
areas.139  The statute also allows law enforcement to keep the data for up 
to 150 days unless it is part of an ongoing investigation.140 
Other jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, only permit the use of its own 
license plate database. However, a law enforcement agency may utilize 
additional sources if the matter relates to an active criminal 
investigation.141 That data must be destroyed within thirty days unless the 
data is related to a criminal investigation.  Utah does not allow data to be 
stored for more than twenty-one days.142 Montana’s statute provides that 
information gained by a license plate reader may only be used for official 
law enforcement purposes to identify vehicles that are believed to be:   
stolen; linked to a wanted, missing, or endangered individual; registered 
to someone against whom there is an outstanding warrant; in violation of 
commercial trucking laws; involved in specific criminal surveillance; part 














141. MINN. STAT. §13.824 3(b) (2015). 
142. MAINE REV. STAT. §2117-A(5) (2013). 
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be connected to that offense.143  
On the other hand, Florida’s law merely provides that an ALPR refers 
to high-speed cameras combined with computer algorithms to convert 
pictures of license plates into computer-readable data.  In turn, the 
Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Law 
Enforcement, is tasked with creating a schedule for keeping records 
containing pictures and data obtained through its system. This retention 
must create a maximum time that the records may be retained.144 
Despite the various statutory limitations on the use of ALPRs, courts 
may not automatically suppress evidence or an arrest just because the 
ALPR statute is not strictly followed or if system guidelines are not 
properly followed. In People v. Davila, the Supreme Court of New York 
in Bronx County noted that the New York City Police Department uses 
an image-processing technology system mounted on the top of police cars 
to automatically identify vehicles by their license plates.145 The plates are 
then compared against a “hotlist” containing information about vehicles 
that have been reported stolen, where registration or insurance coverage 
has lapsed, or other similar violations of law.146 If there is a match, an 
alarm sounds on the laptop computer mounted in the vehicle, notifying 
the officer of the problem.147 
NYPD guidelines consisted of a two-step process to safeguard the 
reliability of license plate reader information. Initially, officers were 
required to update the hotlist database with information from the last 
twenty-four hours.148 If the alarm sounded, before “initiating any law 
enforcement action”, the officer had to look at the database to make sure 
that the plate reader information is correct.149 In Davila, the officer was 
driving around in his patrol car but had not verified whether the hotlist 
had been updated. A car then passed his cruiser and an alarm sounded 
indicating that the car’s registration had been suspended.150 The officers 
approached the car and thought that the occupants were acting 
suspiciously. One law enforcement agent saw a bulge in the defendant’s 
trouser area and found a gun.151 Upon questioning, the defendant claimed 
that he had been in an earlier confrontation. After his arrest, the accused 
moved to suppress the evidence related to the weapon.152 The court 
 
143. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-117(2)(d)(v) (2017). 
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denied the motion and found that the officer’s failure to follow the 
guidelines did not invalidate the police stop.153 According to the court, 
the NYPD guidelines are merely suggestions for ideal practices and they 
do not represent the law. The officer reasonably relied on the license plate 
reader’s hotlist and the database was not “stale,” as the defendant 
suggested. Rather, it had been updated only 36 hours before the stop and 
accurately reflected the status of the owner’s car.154 
Whether scanned license plate data is discoverable was at issue in 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. The 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.155 The American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) filed suit to obtain the ALPR data collected by the Los 
Angeles Police Department for one week to ascertain if it showed whether 
the police were using the information to target specific people, 
neighborhoods, or organizations as well as to determine the degree to 
which the technology was threatening individual policy interests.156 The 
City objected to the request, claiming that the law allowed it to withhold 
records that are part of an investigation as well as when the public’s 
interest in disclosure is outweighed by the need to keep the information 
private.157 The Supreme Court of California agreed with the City’s 
position and prohibited the discovery of the data.  The court noted that the 
police department recorded between 1.7 and 1.8 million license plates a 
week and kept that data for two years.158 Disclosing such  material would 
threaten the privacy of everyone affiliated with the scanned plates and the 
sheer volume of material would make that threat significant.159  That data 
would show the daily activities of its citizens, such as where they were at 
a certain time, their employment location, home address, and places that 
they visited.160 Therefore, the court ruled that the request was a situation 
in which the “public interest in preventing such a disclosure, clearly 
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of these records.”161  
Carpenter v. United States warrants watching in the future because of 
the potential impact of the decision involving surveillance conducted in 
public areas.162 This case dealt with whether the  “government conducts 
a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell 
phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user's past 
 
153. Id. at 791. 
154. Id. 
155. Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Super. Crt., 3 Cal. 5th 1032 (Cal. 2017). 
156. Id. at 1043-44. 
157. Id. at 1044. 
158. Id. at 1037. 
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161. Id. 
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movements.”163 In every instance when a phone connects to a cell site, it 
creates a time-stamped record dubbed “cell-site location information 
(CSLI).”164 Wireless carriers retain CSLI for the start and end of 
incoming calls and gather site information from the transmission of text 
messages and regular data connections.165  
Carpenter dealt with an incident in 2011 where four individuals were 
apprehended as suspects in the robbery of several Radio Shack and T–
Mobile stores. Based upon a confession, the FBI reviewed the phone 
records of one of the suspects, and this data and site sector information 
placed him near the scene of several crimes.166 He was arrested and 
moved to suppress the cell-site data provided by the wireless carriers, 
alleging that the Government's seizure of the records violated the Fourth 
Amendment because the information had been acquired without a warrant 
based upon probable cause.167  
In applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools, 
the Court noted that it has sought to “assure preservation of that degree of 
privacy against the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted.”168 Because of the huge storage capacity of cell phones, the 
police must usually acquire a warrant before examining the contents of a 
phone.169 The instant fact pattern dealt with the Government's 
procurement of a wireless carrier’s cell-site records revealing the location 
of the defendant’s cell phone whenever he placed or received calls.170 
This personal location information kept by a third party did not fit 
precisely under any existing precedent so the Court was left to its own 
devices.171  
The Court held the use of CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment 
violation, noting that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through 
CSLI. The location information obtained from [the defendant’s] wireless 
carriers was the product of a search.”172 A person does not give up all 
Fourth Amendment protections merely by entering a public space. 
Instead, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”173 Allowing 
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the government to obtain cell-site records violates that expectation.174 
Likewise, mapping a cell phone's position over many days affords an all-
encompassing log of the person's whereabouts. This information offers a 
detailed glimpse into the individual’s life, showing his “familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”175 Since obtaining CSLI 
constitutes a search, “the Government must generally obtain a warrant 
supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.”176 The 
impact of this decision remains to be seen but it does offer safeguards 
with certain data that is obtained from a public area. 
III. POLICE USE OF DRONES  
To some, perhaps the ultimate intrusion into one’s privacy would occur 
if the police could take to the air to secretly conduct surveillance of their 
citizens. That day has arrived with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(“UAV”) or drones. This aerial technology has become commonplace, 
with 1.1 million UAVs being employed in the United States. It is 
predicted that this number will triple to almost 3.5 million devices by 
2021.177 The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College 
determined that, as of 2018, as many as 910 state and local public safety 
agencies have purchased UAVs with more than half of this number 
belonging to law enforcement agencies.178  
Police use of drone technology will only increase because of the low 
cost of the equipment. A good drone costs about $3,000 and it can be 
equipped with a very powerful zoom-enabled camera for another $3,000. 
A police helicopter, on the other hand, costs anywhere from one-half 
million to several million dollars.179 The cost to fly a helicopter is about 
$200 to $400 an hour, not counting maintenance expenses.180 Comparing 
the costs of these two types of aerial technology, law enforcement could 
buy a fleet of 500 drones instead of one helicopter. This would allow them 
to blanket a large area with UAVs that can follow people unnoticed from 
thousands of feet away and employ software that can identify individuals 
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A. UAV and Drone Equipment 
Most advances in the development of drones occurred during periods 
of war.182 These unmanned flying machines gained much recognition 
during their use in military incursions in the Middle East following the 
September 11th attacks. The government employed these devices to 
perform surveillance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, in addition to 
dropping targeted weapons.183 Because drones fly hundreds of feet above 
the ground, they are usually undetectable by those being watched.184 
These flying machines gained a domestic application in 2005 when 
Customs and Border Patrol started using them to monitor the Canadian 
and Mexican borders, detecting large quantities of marijuana and 
cocaine.185  
Surveillance UAVs have very sophisticated imaging technology that 
offers the capability to acquire detailed images of individuals, terrain, 
houses and even small objects.186 The drone cameras are usually high 
definition and can provide live-feed video streams at a rate of 10 frames 
a second. Some systems even allow the operator to follow more than 50 
varied targets across a distance of 65 square miles.187 Because the units 
can be equipped with thermal infrared video cameras, heat sensors, and 
radar, drones can allow sophisticated and continuous surveillance 24 
hours a day.188 They can also be coupled with cell-phone interception 
devices, specialized software (such as license plate readers), facial 
recognition software and GPS trackers.189  
UAVs come in varying sizes from small quadrotors to large fixed 
aircraft. They differ from manned aircraft due to their much smaller size, 
reduced costs, ability to fly at low altitudes and easy deployment.190 
Drones can be manually operated through hand-held devices with video 
cameras so that the operator can view the area in which the device is being 
employed. They can fly autonomously without the need for a person to 
manually control the drone.191 
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B. UAV Use by Law Enforcement  
Police departments routinely use UAV and drone technology as part of 
their law enforcement arsenal.192 This application has moved past the 
experimental phase and drones are being employed by law enforcement 
in their day to day operations at a rapidly increasing pace. This usage has 
increased by a staggering 518% just during the past two years.193  
A variety of police drone applications exist, ranging from search and 
rescue operations to crime scene analysis.194 For example, UAVs permit 
the police to scour a location where suspects might be hiding while 
keeping the surveillance as discreet as possible. Where police vehicles 
can be easily spotted, a drone permits discreet observations while 
safeguarding officers from danger.195 UAVs are very useful in search and 
rescue missions because they can cover vast territories more quickly and 
efficiently than officers on foot. They can also fly under trees, over water, 
and between buildings—providing access that is not possible by a 
chopper.196 Drones are even employed to help the police follow a suspect. 
For instance, it is difficult for ground forces to keep track of a suspect 
who has fled to a rooftop area. A UAV provides an eye in the sky that 
relays key information about a suspect’s movements and directs the police 
to optimal positions.197 Aerial devices can also help identify suspects, 
ascertain what weapons they might be carrying, and assist in collecting 
evidence that may be impossible to retrieve from the ground.198 
Other applications include using a drone to obtain a three-dimensional 
reconstruction of an accident scene, since the aircraft can obtain evidence 
from angles that would normally be impossible to film without a 
helicopter.199 UAVs are used to manage and observe traffic and to 
determine why it is backed-up. This information can then be used to 
detour traffic, change the rate of red and green lights to better manage the 
flow of traffic, and detect speeding vehicles.200 Drones also have 
applications following a natural disaster where it may be impossible for 
vehicles to access the area and identify people in need of help. They have 
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even been deployed to manage large events such as the Super Bowl, 
Spring Break parties, and the Daytona 500. This surveillance allows the 
police to detect trouble before it becomes unmanageable and to redirect 
their personnel to troubled areas.201   
A recent trend in drone use arises in a business context. A growing 
number of employers are utilizing UAVs to oversee their property and 
workers on a customary basis.202 These applications include watching 
workers believed to be engaged in the theft or misappropriation of 
confidential information, viewing the performance and efficiency of 
workers, and halting unsanctioned use of, or damage to, business 
assets.203 
C. Autonomous UAVs 
There has been much publicity about industries, such as Amazon, 
attempting to expand the commercial application of autonomous drones 
by delivering their products. There are three major roadblocks to this 
adoption in the United States:  Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 
rules, limited flight time, and privacy concerns.204  The FAA has two 
regulations that are obstacles to the full implementation of autonomous 
drone operation:  Beyond Visual Line of Sight (“BVLOS”) flight, and 
Detect and Avoidance (“DAA”).205 BVLOS rules provide that an operator 
must be able to visualize the drone at all times while in flight. This 
directive would prevent autonomous or remotely directed flights. The 
pilot provides a manned aircraft with a built-in system to detect other 
planes in the area and to take avoidance measures when necessary. This 
is difficult with a drone because the operator is on the ground, or, in the 
case of an autonomous UAV, no pilot exits to “see and avoid” other 
aircraft by taking evasive action.206   The second obstacle is that current 
battery limitations provide drones with an average flight life of about 30 
minutes.207 The last hurdle is one of privacy and the drone’s ability to 
visualize areas that are normally not accessible to public view.208 
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D. Criticisms of UAV and Drone Technology 
Critics maintain that aerial surveillance undercuts the safeguards 
imposed to prevent unreasonable location tracking and the government’s 
accumulation of personal information.209 Drones present a unique 
challenge for privacy rights.210  They provide the government with the 
opportunity to track the movements of individuals and index participation 
in constitutionally protected activities such as protests, political rallies, 
and religious ceremonies.211  After all, inconspicuous drones permit the 
police to spy on people from thousands of feet away with a high degree 
of precision.212 Coupled with other automated identifying technologies, 
such as license plate readers and facial recognition software, Big Brother 
will be able to surveil people unnoticed, monitor their movements over 
time, and identify them through a single image.213  
These concerns are real, as demonstrated by research conducted by the 
ACLU. The ACLU discovered that the FBI was using aerial surveillance 
to record protestors, and sellers of the equipment were marketing drones 
to law enforcement agencies by highlighting the drone’s capacity to 
identify people at public gatherings.214 Drone cameras can even be paired 
with facial recognition software contained in the FBI’s Next Generation 
identification database or DHS’ IDENT, two of the biggest compendia of 
biometric data in the world, thereby creating First Amendments perils for 
political protestors.215  
E. Judicial and Legislative Responses to UAV and Drone Technology 
UAVs usually operate in an area below the navigable airspace 
regulated by the FAA, “in the vertical curtilage that is viewed as 
belonging to a property owner.”216 This airspace was unregulated until 
recently. Now, these unmanned aircraft trigger FAA law requirements, as 
well as the property rights of landowners.217 In this regard, the 
government, in June 2016, issued its first operational rules for customary 
use of small, unmanned aircraft systems. The regulations provide safety 
rules for drones that weigh less than fifty-five pounds and conduct non-
 
209. Laperruque, supra note 178, at 2. 
210. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182. 
211. Laperruque, supra note 178, at 2. 
212. Id. at 3. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182. 
216. Elizabeth Austermuehle, Drones and Private Property Rights, 34 No. 26 WESTLAW J. 
AVIATION, 1 (2017). 
217. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182. 
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/2
52 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
hobbyist operations.218 
Generally, UAV operators are required to fly their devices within their 
visual sightline and regulations bar them from flying over individuals on 
land who are not participating in the drone’s operation.219 This 
dramatically restricts drone use over land that does not belong to the 
UAV’s operator, but regulations do not expressly address the rights of 
adjacent landowners who desire to limit drones from flying over their 
property.220 In the absence of federal or state laws permitting these 
unmanned aircraft to operate above private property without the owner's 
consent, drones are not authorized to fly over these areas.221 Violators are 
subject to suit by landowners who may enforce their rights through a tort 
action, including trespass and invasion-of-privacy claims.222 
In a criminal context, the Supreme Court of the United States has found 
that citizens generally do not enjoy Fourth Amendment protections 
against drone use because anyone might see what can be visualized from 
the air.223  The weakness in this position is that the average person does 
not use drones with the sophistication of those employed by the 
government.224 State courts have also issued varying opinions on whether 
UAVs violate a person’s privacy rights.225   
Most jurisdictions do not require the police to obtain a search warrant 
before engaging in drone surveillance. However,  at least eighteen states 
now require law enforcement in certain situations to obtain a warrant 
before using a drone for surveillance purposes, while others have issued 
civil penalties if drones take video or sound recordings of another without 
obtaining that person’s consent.226 These jurisdictions include Alaska, 
Florida,227 Idaho, Illinois,228 Indiana, Iowa, Maine,229 Montana, North 
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Vermont, Virginia235 and Wisconsin.236    
The first judicial pronouncements involving aerial surveillance arose 
with searches conducted by traditional aircraft. In 1986 in California v. 
Ciraolo, the Supreme Court determined that a search of a fenced-in 
backyard conducted by air and without a warrant was allowed under the 
Fourth Amendment. 237 The facts reveal that based upon a tip that 
marijuana was being grown in the defendant’s secured backyard, a private 
airplane was flown over the premises and an officer spotted the illegal 
plants growing in the backyard.238 The police obtained a search warrant 
and seized the plants. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence 
of the seizure, claiming that aerial surveillance was a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.239 The Court noted that the defendant had the 
subjective intent to maintain his privacy since a ten-foot-high fence had 
been built around the backyard to conceal the marijuana crop.240  
However, such a fence does not hide these illegal plants from police 
observation by an officer standing on top of a truck or bus.241 After all, 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect a person’s expectation of privacy 
if the officer’s observations can be made from a public viewing point.242 
In this case, the observations of the marijuana occurred within public 
airspace. Society is operating in an era where aircrafts routinely fly over 
property, so it is not reasonable to conclude that marijuana plants in 
someone’s backyard are constitutionally protected.243 The police are not 
mandated to obtain a warrant when they use public airways at an altitude 
of 1,000 feet to see what is visible to the naked eye.244   
The Supreme Court decided a second case during the same year in Dow 
Chemical Company v. United States.245 Dow Chemical employed 
elaborate measures to safeguard its property from the prying eyes of those 
on the ground.246 Under a plant inspection, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) hired a commercial aerial photographer to shoot a 
picture of the plant from various altitudes.247  Dow maintained that these 
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pictures violated its Fourth Amendment rights by exposing trade 
secrets.248  
The Court started its decision by noting that Dow admitted that an 
aerial observation with the naked eye, or the snapping of a picture from a 
surrounding hill overlooking the facility, would not be constitutionally 
protected.249 The issue was whether an aerial mapping camera of a large 
industrial plant was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.250  In this 
regard, the Court has noted that “the public and police lawfully may 
survey lands from the air.”251  The pictures, in this case, were not so 
detailed as to raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Although the images 
indeed provided the EPA with “more detailed information than naked-eye 
views, they remain limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and 
equipment. The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at 
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”252 
A third case reached the Supreme Court a few years later in Florida v. 
Riley.253 The issue before the Court was “[w]hether surveillance of the 
interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from 
the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse 
constitutes a ‘search’ for which a warrant is required under the Fourth 
Amendment.”254 The Court found that this search did not violate the 
Constitution based upon its prior holdings. The judges were not impressed 
by the low altitude at which the helicopter flew while making the 
observations, since any member of the public flying in an aircraft could 
have made the same observations.255 While these cases do not specifically 
address the framework of surveillance conducted by a drone, they set the 
foundation for the subsequent law in this area.  
Westlaw searches involving drones and the Fourth Amendment or 
drone surveillance by the police reveal only a handful of cases on the 
topic. Several of the decisions involve pro-se plaintiffs.256  Byers v. State 
of Indiana is a recent decision involving a woman who was mowing her 
lawn when she discovered a drone in her backyard.257 She noticed a flash 
drive attached to the unmanned aircraft, so she pugged it into her home 
 
248. Id. at 232. 
249. Id. at 234. 
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251. Id. at 238 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)). 
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254. Id. at 447-48 (citing Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987), cert. granted, rev’d, 488 U.S. 
445 (1989)). 
255. Id. at 450-51. 
256. This statement is based upon a Westlaw search conducted by the author on December 19, 2019. 
257. Byers v. State, 134 N.E.3d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), transfer denied, 141 N.E.3d 807 (Ind. 
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computer and found footage of a woman, who she recognized as her 
neighbor, handling a bag filled with white powder.258   
The homeowner contacted the police and turned over the flash drive, 
and the police then obtained a search warrant. A subsequent search of the 
defendant’s home uncovered methamphetamine and a handgun.259 The 
defendant was arrested and she moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
as the result of the drone search under the Fourth Amendment.260  The 
Court found the evidence was admissible since only four days had elapsed 
from when the video was shot and the issuance of the warrant.261 At no 
time did the defendant directly challenge the video obtained by the drone.  
People have also been arrested for using drones to take unauthorized 
images. For example, one of the first prosecutions for conducting 
unauthorized surveillance through the use of a drone occurred in New 
York when the defendant was arrested after taking images of a medical 
building using his unmanned device.262  At trial, the defendant claimed 
that he was using his device to take “videos and photos of the facade of 
the structure” while waiting for his mother's doctor’s appointment to 
finish.263 The defendant asserted that the drone's camera did not have a 
zoom lens, the building's windows were tinted, and the video did not 
reveal the inside of the premises. 264 Both the government and workers 
inside of the office raised concerns about patient privacy, but the 
defendant was found not guilty of the charges. 265  
The opposite result was rendered in Wisconsin in 2015.266 In this case, 
a drone operator was found guilty of five counts for the employment of 
his unmanned aircraft “to harass residents in a…neighborhood.”267 The 
facts show that the charges were filed in response to complaints by 
neighbors that a drone was “flying near their windows and observing 
them on their private property.”268  The defendant was convicted of 
violating a law that made it illegal for an “individual to use a drone to 
observe a person in a place where that person should have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”269  
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Issues involving drone use have arisen in a civil context. F.W.T. v. F/T. 
provides an example.270 This case entails a dispute between a father and 
son concerning a long-standing quarrel between them.271 The purpose of 
the lawsuit was an action by the son to obtain an order against harassment 
because his father allegedly had someone fly a drone over his property 
three times to hinder the son’s development of the land.272 According to 
the law, such an action requires a showing that the conduct “caused fear, 
intimidation, abuse or damage.”273  
  The court refused to grant the protective order and noted that there 
was no evidence to show that the elements of the statute had been 
satisfied.274  Merely flying a drone over, or trespassing upon, the land to 
film a worksite does not rise to the level of harassment within the meaning 
of the law.275 In no way did the court approve of the conduct of the father, 
but it noted that the proper cause of action would have been a claim for 
“nuisance, trespass or other cause of action, enforceable through” 
equitable relief.276 
Flores v. State of Texas presented a constitutional challenge to a 
recently passed law regulating the utilization of drones.277 The evidence 
demonstrated that drones have become increasingly popular by law 
enforcement agencies for policing and surveillance activities.278 This use 
has also expanded into the public sector for commercial, scientific and 
recreational purposes. This has raised questions about privacy rights and 
the legal use of drone-captured pictures.279 In this regard, Texas passed a 
law making it criminal to use a drone to take images of other individuals 
on their land. It further allowed the property owner to obtain injunctive 
relief or monetary damages in case of a violation.280 The police, however, 
enjoy an exception when they use drones for official activities, such as 
the pursuit of a suspect, documenting a crime scene or taking pictures for 
immigration purposes within twenty-five miles of the border.281    
The plaintiff, in this case, was a resident of Laredo, Texas and his 
property was within the twenty-five-mile zone. He filed suit to obtain 
injunctive relief declaring that the border exception violated his rights 
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under the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy afforded by the 
Constitution.282  As the plaintiff noted, this exception provides a 
“playground for drone enthusiasts who would otherwise be precluded 
from filming people in their homes, washing their cars, gardening in their 
yard, or simply walking on their private property” to be observed without 
any type of protection as long as they are within twenty-five miles of the 
border, while everyone else in the state is protected.283  The court denied 
the request on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the 
law. It noted that standing requires more than an allegation of residency 
within the zone.284 The plaintiff must show that an identifiable drone was 
used to take images of him on his land. Mere generalizations and a 
hypothetical injury are not enough285 and living within the twenty-five 
miles zone was insufficient to establish an actual injury.286 
In Allums v. Department of Homeland Security, a pro se plaintiff 
claimed that the government was harassing him through a variety of 
activities, such as showing up at his house to eat ice cream and stare at 
him, as well as committing copyright violations of his work.287 In his fifth 
count, Allums asserted that he had been the subject of drone surveillance 
and attacks by the government, as well as agents telling him that he would 
soon be “killing Americans with Drone Airplanes.”288 The plaintiff 
maintained that these activities were carried out by agents who ordered 
his execution by airborne devices that flew close to his head, causing him 
to duck and fall to the ground.289 Not surprisingly, the court dismissed the 
lawsuit for the failure to state a claim. The court considered the plaintiff’s 
allegations fanciful and frivolous. There were simply no facts to support 
his conclusory allegations that the government was surveilling him.290  
IV. FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARE  
Anonymity in the 21st Century is no longer an option since most people 
now have some form of photo identification and surveillance technology 
is constantly expanding. These developments have caused most members 
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without their knowledge or consent. Facial recognition software refers to 
equipment that has the dual role of “connecting faces to identities” and 
enabling the “distribution of those identities across computer 
networks.”291 
Facial recognition technology (“FRT”) can be traced back to the mid-
1960s, when researchers first started working with computers to 
recognize human faces.292 By the 1990s, automated facial recognition 
algorithms were developed, and after the September 11th attacks, FRT 
became part of the public discourse.293 The federal government invested 
heavily in FRT, and millions of dollars in grants were awarded to state 
and local governments to establish databases. What started as 
government-funded research in computer sciences eventually made its 
way into the private sector.294 FRT software is now employed by stores 
to scan the faces of customers and pre-identify shoplifters and people 
known to file lawsuits.295 Some airlines use FRT to speed up the boarding 
process.296 Microsoft has even created a billboard that recognizes people 
as they walk by and then deploys personalized ads associated with the 
individual’s buying history.297 
FRT is linked to a database of images, such as mugshots, government 
issued identification photos (such as drivers licenses and passports), and 
social media accounts to rapidly identify people through biometrics to 
match key facial features, such as the distance between the eyes and the 
gap between the forehead and chin.298  These measurements then create a 
“facial signature” that is linked to a mathematical formula and compared 
to a database of stored images.299 As one might imagine, FRT is a much 
in-demand law enforcement tool for solving crimes by ascertaining the 
identity of the offenders who are imaged on surveillance footage, locating 
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fugitives in a crowd, or locating terrorists as they enter the country.300 
Other suggested applications include spotting problem gamblers in 
casinos, greeting guests at hotels or on ships, linking people on dating 
websites, identifying underage drinkers, and helping take attendance at 
schools.301  
A.  How Does FRT Work? 
Some people have the innate ability to remember a face. This 
recognition occurs because the individual can retain identifying 
information about the facial features such as the eyes, nose, mouth, and 
how those features come together to form a familiar pattern.302 Facial 
recognition systems work similarly, albeit on an algorithmic scale. Where 
a person visualizes a face, FRT recognizes data that is stored and can be 
easily accessed. In this regard, 50% of adults in the United States have 
their pictures warehoused in one or more facial-recognition databases that 
law enforcement agencies can search.303 Matching a picture to a person 
generally works in the following way: 
• The first step requires that a person’s face be captured.304 
Traditionally, this mandates the captured picture to be of a face 
looking directly at the camera, with only a slight change in light 
or facial expression from the database image.305  
• A template for FRT is then made, which consists of measurements 
of facial characteristics, such as the distance between the eyes, the 
width of the mouth or depth of the eye sockets. These landmarks 
are dubbed nodal points, and the measurements are inputted into 
a template with a distinctive code.306 Every face has about 80 
nodal points.307 
• These nodal points are then analyzed, and the software will 
compare the template of the person’s face to those stored in a 
database to search for a potential match.308 
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The chances of law enforcement officials finding a match are high 
since more 117 million Americans have facial pictures stored in one or 
more government databases and the FBI has access to 412 million 
images.309 In fact, FBI facial recognition searches now outnumber court-
ordered wiretaps.310  
 B. Advantages of FRT 
FRT has multiple applications and offers a variety of benefits that vary 
depending upon the user. For instance, governments internationally use 
FRT in police, military, and intelligence operations, and businesses use 
FRT in security, advertising, banking, sales, and health care.311 One of 
FRT’s most important benefits, however, is that it can make law 
enforcement operations much more efficient.  
Officials can submit a photograph of a recently apprehended individual 
through its system to identify the person and ascertain if there are 
outstanding warrants for other offenses.312 It can help officers in the field 
observing a large gathering, like a sporting event or political rally, identify 
people of interest, known terrorists, and wanted criminals.313 It is also 
being used to ensure efficient regulation. The New York Department of 
Motor Vehicles, for instance, has used FRT to detect fraudulent 
licenses314 and the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office in Florida uses it to 
identify inmates at the time of booking and release.315 
FRT offers a faster way to process individuals without stopping each 
person to ask for identification. The system can even be used as an 
alternative for a password to access computers316 or to gain entry into a 
building or secured location. Since no passwords are needed with facial 
recognition, there is nothing that a hacker or thief could compromise. This 
would prevent someone from using a stolen identification for 
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impersonation purposes.317 It is also favored over fingerprint scanning 
due to its non-contact process. The possible disadvantages of dealing with 
fingerprint identification methods, such as germs or smudges, will be 
eliminated.318 It can even eliminate time fraud by employees. Facial 
recognition will prevent a co-worker from time-stamping someone else’s 
attendance or timesheets since each person must pass a face-scanning 
device to check in and out of work.319  
A lesser-known advantage of FRT is its ability to find missing persons. 
For instance, police in China were able to find a missing six-year-old by 
using a picture that had been taken days earlier with cameras linked to 
FRT.320 New Delhi authorities reported finding nearly 3,000 missing 
children within days of launching a facial recognition program.321 Aside 
from leading to breakthroughs in missing children cases, FRT has also led 
to breakthroughs in cases involving the mentally ill. For instance, a 
mentally ill man who had been in a Chinese hospital for over a year was 
reunited with his family. The hospital had been unable to identify him, 
but a facial recognition firm was able to do so by linking a picture of his 
face with public records.322 These success stories suggest that FRT could 
be an essential tool in helping vulnerable populations. 
C.  Technological Limitations of FRT 
FRT has certain limitations. This was revealed following the Boston 
Marathon bombings, which showed that the FBI lacked the appropriate 
software and databases to immediately identify the suspects.323 While 
government databases contained the pictures of both Boston Marathon 
bombings suspects, the software could not match the surveillance footage 
to these database images.324 Although FRT has become increasingly 
accurate, certain factors will still yield false positives, false negatives, or, 
as in this case, undetected faces.325 These influences include the 
sophistication of the camera, distance, database size, algorithm, and 
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the subject’s race and gender.326   
There are several limitations to FRT. Poor image quality will limit 
the effectiveness of FRT since it affects the usefulness of facial-
recognition algorithms.  This is an inherent problem because the quality 
of a scanning video is much lower than that of a digital camera.327 The 
comparative dimensions of the face with the image size also influence 
how well the face will be identified. Therefore, small image sizes cause 
facial recognition difficulties.328 The angle of the target’s face to the 
camera is another factor that significantly impacts the recognition score. 
The more direct the face is to the camera, the higher the resolution of the 
image becomes, and a higher score is achieved for a resulting match. 
Accuracy rates also drop as the number of pictures in a database increases. 
This is because the database is likely to have images of people that look 
very similar, leading the algorithm to pick the wrong person.329  
The accuracy of automated facial recognition algorithms also depends 
upon the subject. The faces of individuals change over time, which can 
throw off the algorithm in identifying a person from an earlier picture. 
Additionally, changes that happen from one day to the next, such as 
hairstyles and facial expressions, can lead to improper identification.330  
Finally, accuracy rates are lower in certain demographics. Facial 
recognition algorithms have been less successful with minorities, women, 
and young adults than Caucasians, men, and older adults.331 This is 
because facial-recognition algorithms were trained on databases that 
mostly contained pictures of white males.332 As a result, one study found 
that there is an error rate of around 31% when identifying the gender of 
women with dark skin.333  
Accuracy is important when a person’s civil and liberty interests are 
involved, which is why FRT vendors advertise accuracy rates of over 
95%.334 However, this figure must be questioned when it is followed by 
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the disclaimer: “[This company] makes no representation or warranties as 
to the accuracy and reliability of the product in the performance of its 
facial recognition.”335 Even less reassuring is the fact that law 
enforcement is not required to perform independent testing to determine 
the accuracy of the FRT it uses.336 While the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (“NIST”) conducts voluntary tests of FRT 
every four years, many law enforcement entities do not participate in 
these audits.337 Some law enforcement entities recognize that FRT is not 
flawless, so they have a human verify the results.338 However, this 
additional step does not guarantee accuracy, since people tend to be good 
at recognizing familiar faces but have difficulty recognizing unfamiliar 
faces.339 Inaccuracies are equally prevalent in the private sector.  
D. Legislative Responses to FRT 
Some legislatures have passed laws that limit the use of FRT and courts 
have interpreted these laws to require warrants and other protections.340 
However, Congress has yet to enact federal legislation that directly 
regulates FRT. This is a major concern among citizens because of 
questions about the technology’s accuracy and whether there is built-in 
bias and misinformation in these systems.341 Nevertheless, FBI facial 
recognition systems are governed primarily by two statutes: the Privacy 
Act of 1974342 and the E-Government Act of 2002.343 These statutes 
require that the FBI conduct Privacy Impact Assessments (“PIA”s) of its 
biometric programs and that it employ Fair Information Practices 
Principles (“FIPPS”).344 PIAs analyze how personal identifiable 
information is handled in electronic systems and determine the risk of 
 
335. Id. 
336. Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias 
Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://apexart.org/images/breiner/articles/FacialRecognitionSoftwareMight.pdf.  
337. Id. 
338. John D. Woodward, et al., Biometrics: A Look at Facial Recognition, RAND 13, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB396.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
339. Id. at 11. (explaining that in a British study conducted at a supermarket, 34% of the cards 
accepted by trained supermarket cashiers had a picture of a person that did not look like the shopper 
and 7% of the rejected cards contained a picture of the actual shopper). 
340. Garvie et al., supra note 311. 
341. Martin, supra note 299, at *2. 
342. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2014). 
343. 44 U.S.C. § 101 (1996); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq (2002); Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, 
Now You See Me, Now You Still Do: Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of 
Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 105 (2020). 
344. Id. at 105-06. 
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collecting, maintaining, and disseminating this information.345 
Meanwhile, FIPPs highlight the importance of transparency, consent, 
limited use, data quality, data minimization, security, and accountability 
when dealing with personal identifiable information. 346 
Efforts to implement laws that specifically target FRT use are 
underway. Last year, the House of Representatives passed an amendment 
to the Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2020,347 which 
would require that the Director of National Intelligence report FRT use, 
accuracy, policies, and its potential impact on constitutional rights.348 
Meanwhile, two Senators have introduced the Facial Recognition 
Technology Warrant Act, which would require federal law enforcement 
to obtain a warrant to use FRT for tracking the movements of a person for 
more than three days.349 Other recently proposed bills include the 
Algorithmic Accountability Act,350 the Commercial Facial Recognition 
Privacy Act,351 the No Biometric Barriers Act,352 the FACE Protection 
Act353, and H.R.3875.354 The Algorithmic Accountability Act would 
require that entities storing personal information conduct impact 
assessments of their automated decision systems.355 The Commercial 
Facial Recognition Privacy Act would prohibit commercial entities from 
using FRT to identify consumers without their consent.356 The No 
 
345. Department of Justice /FBI Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/privacy-impact-assessments (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
346. National Domestic Communications Assistance Center: Executive Board Meeting, FBI (Sept. 
21, 2016), https://ndcac.fbi.gov/file-repository/2016-september-fair-information-practice-
principles.pdf/view.  
347. See HPSCI Fact Sheet on H.R. 3494 Fiscal Year 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fact_sheet_on_2020_iaa.pdf. 
348. See Amendment to Rules Committee (July 15, 2019), https://amendments-
rules.house.gov/amendments/JAYAPA_066_xml71519135205525.pdf; see also Oakland Approves 
Face Recognition Surveillance Ban as Congress Moves to Require Government Transparency, 
ACLU (July 17, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/oakland-approves-face-recognition-
surveillance-ban-congress-moves-require-government (noting that the ACLU is now urging 
Congress to vote in favor of this amendment). 
349. See Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act of 2019, S.2878, 116th Cong. (2019). 
350. See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019). 
351. See Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S.847, 116th Cong. (2019). 
352. See No Biometric Barriers to Housing Act of 2019, H.R. 4008, 116th Cong. (2019).; Inioluwa 
Raji et al., Saving Face: Investigating the Ethical Concerns of Facial Recognition Auditing, in  
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 145 (Feb. 
2020), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.00964.pdf. 
353. See FACE Protection Act of 2019, H.R.4021, 116th Cong. (2019). 
354. See To prohibit Federal funding from being used for the purchase or use of facial recognition 
technology, and for other purposes, H.R.3875, 116th Cong. (2019). 
355. See H.R. 2231. 
356. See S. 847. 
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Biometric Barriers Act would bar FRT use in public housing357 and the 
FACE Protection Act would prohibit federal agencies from applying FRT 
to government-issued IDs without a court order.358 Finally, H.R.3875 
would prohibit using federal funds to purchase and utilize FRT.359 
On the state level, California, Oregon, and New Hampshire have 
started to regulate FRT use in the public sector by banning the use of FRT 
in police body cameras.360 Several states have also enacted laws to 
regulate FRT outside of law enforcement. Illinois passed the Biometric 
Information Privacy Act, which sets up significant restrictions on how 
private companies obtain and use an individual’s biometric data.361 This 
law requires firms that collect information to notify the person that his or 
her biometric profile is going to be collected, provide the reason for the 
collection, explain the length of time the information is to be collected, 
retained, and used, create a written, publicly available policy that details 
a retention schedule, and secure a written release from the person before 
collecting any biometric information or sharing the biometric data with 
another entity.362 The Act also creates a private cause of action, allowing 
individuals to bring a suit for a mere violation of the law.363  
New York enacted the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data 
Security (“SHIELD”) Act, which became effective on March 21, 2020.364 
The SHIELD Act requires businesses to implement protections for the 
"private information" of New York residents and expands the state’s 
security breach notification requirements.365 The SHIELD Act states that 
any business that stores the private information of New York residents, 
such as biometrics and driver’s license information, must "develop, 
implement, and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect the security, 
 
357. See H.R. 4008. 
358. See H.R.4021. 
359. See H.R.3875. 
360. Benjamin Hodges & Kelly Mennemeier, The Varying Laws Governing Facial Recognition 
Technology, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/28/varying-
laws-governing-facial-recognition-technology/id=118240/. See also Assemb. Bill 1215, 2019-2020 
Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2019). (California law prohibiting the use of FRT in body worn cameras until 
January 2023); H.R. 2571, 78th Or. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).(Oregon law prohibiting 
the use of FRT to analyze body worn camera recordings); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §  105-D:2 (2016).  
(New Hampshire law prohibiting the use of FRT to analyze body worn camera recordings). 
361. Hodges & Mennemeier,  supra note 361. 
362. Landmark Ruling on the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, WINSTON & STRAWN 
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/landmark-ruling-on-the-illinois-
biometric-information-privacy-act.html. 
363. Id. 
364. Philip Gordon & Jennifer Taiwo, The New York SHIELD Act: What Employers Need to Know, 
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confidentiality, and integrity of the private information."366 Unlike the 
law in Illinois, the SHIELD Act does not create a private cause of action. 
Instead, it enables the state's attorney general to enforce the mandates.367  
Texas has a privacy act that forbids obtaining a person’s biometric 
identifiers for commercial purposes unless the individual is first provided 
with notice and consents to the use. The state also limits the sale or 
disclosure of a person’s biometric identifiers except under specific 
conditions.368 Washington has a biometric protection law that bars any 
business or person from inputting biometric data into a database without 
giving notice, obtaining the person’s consent, and offering a way to 
prevent subsequent use of the information for a commercial purpose.369 
Other similar state mandates include: 1) New Hampshire’s statute 
prohibiting the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) from using FRT 
when taking and retaining pictures,370 2) Maine’s statute requiring state 
officials to issue rules that limit FRT use in drones,371 3) Washington’s 
law requiring the DMV to notify license applicants that FRT may be used 
to verify their identities and restricting the disclosure of results372 and 4) 
Missouri’s statute prohibiting the Department of Revenue from using 
FRT to produce a license or identify licensees.373  
The number of states regulating FRT is likely to grow since the 
legislatures of eleven other states have introduced bills limiting FRT-use 
in both the public and private sectors. These states are Idaho,374 
Indiana,375 Maryland,376 Massachusetts,377 Michigan,378 Minnesota,379 








370. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:40-b (2014). 
371. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tt. 25, § 4501(5)(D) (2015). 
372. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.037(3) (West 2012). 
373. MO. REV. STAT. § 302.170 (2019). 
374. H.R. 492, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Id. 2020). 
375. H.R. 1238, 121st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (In. 2020). 
376. S. 613, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); see also S.46, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020). 
377. S.1385, 191st Gen. Court (Ma. 2019). ; S. 1429, 191st Gen. Court (Ma. 2019); H.R. 1538, 
191st Gen. Court (Ma. 2019). 
378. S. 342, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (Mich. 2019); H.R. House 4810, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (Mich. 
2019).  
379. S.1430, 91st Leg. (Minn. 2019); H.R. 1236, 91st Leg. (Minn. 2020).  
380. S.746, 160th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2020). 
381. S.116, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020); G.A. 1210, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020). 
382. H.R. 4709, 123rd Sess. (S.C. 2020).  
383. H.R. 470, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); H.R. 595, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2020). 
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Virginia.384 Some cities have also started taking matters into their own 
hands. San Francisco, Oakland, and Somerville have passed ordinances 
that prohibit local authorities from using FRT.385 In an unusual move, 
Portland, Oregon is taking steps to become the first city to ban both law 
enforcement and private entities from using FRT.386 Finally, some law 
enforcement entities have voluntarily limited their use of FRT. For 
instance, the Seattle Police Department has stopped using FRT because 
of apprehension over bias and inaccurate results and the Detroit Police 
Department will only allow the utilization of FRT when it appears 
reasonably likely to help in the investigation of a violent crime.387 The 
Utah Department of Public Safety has also placed restrictions on FRT in 
active criminal cases, and Portland, Oregon will likely soon follow suit.388 
E. How Can the Defense Recognize a Facial Recognition Case 
Facial identification obtained through a software application cannot be 
used in court as substantive evidence since the technology is not able to 
conclusively match a picture to an identity and there continue to be 
accuracy issues. Therefore,  facial identification is not a scientifically 
reliable tool that can overcome a Frye or Daubert challenge.389 At 
present, the technology should only be employed to develop leads in an 
investigation so its disclosure to defense counsel might not always be 
forthcoming.390  As noted in People v. Carrington, “law enforcement 
[does] not use facial recognition technology as the sole basis to identify 
 
384. H.R.J. Res.  59, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). 
385. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance 107-19 (May 21, 2019) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any Department 
to obtain, retain, access, or use: 1) any Face Recognition Technology; or 2) any information obtained 
from Face Recognition Technology.”); Ordinance Amending Oakland Municipal Code Chapter 
9.64, (“[P]rohibit the City from acquiring, obtaining, retaining, requesting, or accessing Face 
Recognition Software.”); Somerville, Mass., Ordinance 2019-16 (June 27, 2019)  (“It shall be 
unlawful for Somerville or any Somerville official to obtain, retain, access, or use: (1) [a]ny face 
surveillance system; or (2) [a]ny information obtained from a face surveillance system.”). 
386. See Portland, Or., Ordinance (Nov. 08, 2019), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2019/11/18/434828951-portland-unveils-facial-recognition-ban-
proposal.pdf (“Bureaus shall not acquire, evaluate or use Facial Recognition Technologies . . . [and] 
shall not use, access or retain any information derived from Facial Recognition Technologies”); see 
also Developing a Facial Recognition Policy in Portland, PORTLAND.GOV (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://beta.portland.gov/bps/news/2019/12/11/developing-facial-recognition-policy-portland 
(explaining that a policy regulating FRT-use in the private sector is still at the research stage). 
387. Hodges & Mennemeier, supra note 361. 
388. Martin, supra note 299. 
389. Kaitlin Jackson, Challenging Facial Recognition Software in Criminal Cases, NACDL (2019), 
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/548c697c-fd8e-4b8d-b4c3-2540336fad94/challenging-facial-
recognition-software-in-criminal-court_july-2019.pdf; see also People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 
564,576 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that the evidence that facial recognition technology produces has 
value, but it has not been accepted as reliable by relevant scientific communities). 
390. Jackson, supra note 390, at 14. 
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or eliminate a suspect.”391 Therefore, the defense should learn how to 
recognize when FRT might have been used during a criminal 
investigation.392  In this regard, the defense may present a viable 
challenge when facial recognition evidence is used to make an arrest 
without probable cause or in cases involving the arrest of the wrong 
person.393   
Defense counsel should consider the possibility that the police used 
FRT to identify a suspect whenever there is a possibility of 
misidentification because the defendant was suspected of committing the 
offense from the initiation of the investigation, if there was a photo or 
video of the incident, or if there was an eyewitness to the event.394 If the 
answer is yes to any of these questions, defense counsel should try to 
ascertain whether FRT was used.395 This may involve a simple phone call 
to the prosecutor asking for clarification or the issuance of a discovery 
demand depending on the law in the jurisdiction.396 This is important 
because the disclosure of facial recognition use may not be forthcoming 
since the government rarely intends to introduce the algorithm results at 
trial.397   
Lynch v. State of Florida provides an example of where the defendant 
unsuccessfully tried to obtain the algorithm images. This matter involved 
the discovery of photographs generated by a facial recognition system of 
potential suspects other than the defendant.398 The facts show that an 
undercover officer purchased crack cocaine from a person known as 
“Midnight.”399 During the purchase, an officer used his cell phone to take 
a picture of Midnight who was leaning into the car.400  Subsequently, the 
officer sent the picture to a crime analyst who provided the police with 
the defendant’s name and photograph as the result of database searches 
generated by the use of a facial recognition program.401  
At trial, the defendant demanded that the government produce the other 
pictures in the databases of the people who were also known as 
“Midnight.”402 The court denied the request as being irrelevant and the 
defendant was found guilty. The defendant then asserted that the facial 
 
391. People v. Carrington, No. B265888, 2018 WL 671903, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018). 
392. Jackson, supra note 390, at 15.  
393. Id. at 16. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. at 16-17. 
396. Id. at 17. 
397. Id. at 20. 
398. Lynch v. State, 260 So.3d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
399. Id. at 1168. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. at 1169. 
402. Id. 
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recognition software had returned other pictures as possible matches. He 
contended that those pictures would have cast doubt on the state’s case 
and that the government’s failure to produce the images was a violation 
of Brady v. Maryland.403  
The court rejected this argument because there was no reasonable 
probability that the trial results would have been any different if such a 
disclosure had been made.404 The defendant could not show that the other 
pictures in the database resembled him to cause a misidentification nor 
could he show that anyone in those pictures would have been the 
culprit.405  
F.  Court Cases involving FRT 
The government will rarely attempt to use the results of facial 
recognition software as the sole evidence in a criminal case. Rather, it is 
merely a tool that helps to develop other evidence and thus few criminal 
cases are devoted to the topic.  Usually, discussions about facial 
recognition are in the context of a piece of evidence in the chain that led 
to the identification of a suspect. As noted in People v. Carrington, 
FRT is in its infancy and the science is evolving, as well as its reliability 
and accuracy.406 At present, the government does not use FRT as “the 
sole basis to identify or eliminate a suspect.”407  
In a civil litigation context, FRT might arise in an invasion of privacy 
claim, or as a violation of a regulation of biometric technology against 
entities such as Shutterfly, Facebook, Microsoft, Google and other 
businesses that use FRT.  
A Westlaw search using the words “facial recognition technology” 
disclosed 73 criminal and civil matters.408  While the Fourth Amendment 
protects citizens against unreasonable searches, it is uncertain whether 
having images of the people’s faces run through facial recognition 
systems constitutes a search. Like license plate readers, body-worn 
cameras and drones, FRT falls into a “constitutional grey area.”409 
Existing case law, however, sheds some light on the possible outcomes 
once the issue inevitably reaches the Supreme Court. The next sections 
will provide examples of arguments that could be used in criminal cases 
to keep any reference about FRT out of evidence or permit its mention at 
 
403. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
404. Lynch, 260 So.3d at 1170. 
405. Id. 
406. Carrington, 2018 WL 671903, at *11. 
407. Id. 
408. This search was conducted by the authors on February 22, 2020. 
409. Garvie et al., supra note 311. 
40
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/2
70 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
the time of trial.  
 1. Cases That Would Support the Use of FRT in Court 
 U.S. v. Dionisio presents a Supreme Court analogy that would allow 
facial recognition technology to be a permissible police tool. This case 
dealt with a constitutional challenge to a grand jury subpoena requesting 
voice recordings from twenty individuals for identification purposes.410 
Dionisio and other witnesses refused to provide a voice recording and 
argued that being compelled to do so would violate their Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.411 The Supreme Court found that a person does not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy over physical characteristics that 
he exposes to the public.412 “No person can have a reasonable expectation 
that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can 
reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”413 The 
Court also opined that no valid Fifth Amendment claim had been raised 
since the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits compelling 
communications, not forcing a person to submit a photograph or to speak 
for identification purposes.414 
Moreover, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties.”415 In Smith, the Government installed a pen 
register in the offices of a telephone company that was used to record the 
telephone numbers the defendant dialed.416 Smith argued that he expected 
this information to remain private; but the Court disagreed.417 The Court 
explained that when a person shares telephone numbers with a telephone 
company for business purposes, he cannot expect these numbers to remain 
a secret.418 The judges essentially determined that a person assumes the 
risk “in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government.”419  
 
410. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 3 (1973). 
411. Id. 
412. Id. at 14. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. at 6 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). 
415. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). 
416. Id. at 737. 
417. Id. at 743-44. 
418. Id. at 744. 
419. Id. But see 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (overruling Smith by requiring a court order to install a pen 
register). “However, evidence obtained in violation of the statute can be admitted in criminal trials 
because violation of the statute does not result in an unconstitutional search and Congress did not 
provide for exclusion of evidence for violation of the statute.” United States v. Allen, No. ACM 
32727, 1999 WL 305093, at *6 (A.F. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 1999) (citing United States v. Thompson, 
936, F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
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Because the databases accessed by FRT are filled with photos 
voluntarily provided for licensing, employment, immigration, and other 
purposes, the third-party doctrine could be used to support the argument 
that the photos are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court eventually moved on from recognizing that certain 
information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment to determining 
that the use of certain technology to gather such information does not 
constitute a search. In U.S. v Knotts, the Supreme Court found that using 
warrantless monitoring of a beeper to track the defendant’s movements 
did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights since there was 
no legitimate expectation of privacy.420 The Supreme Court explained 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the police from 
“augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”421  
This decision suggests that FRT is merely another piece of permissible 
sensory-augmenting technology  as it merely does something that the 
naked eye could do: look at two images and determine whether they  
portray the same person. 
 2. Cases That Would Oppose the Use of FRT in Court 
The following are some of the cases  suggesting that the use of FRT 
would violate the Constitution. Although a person does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over his facial characteristics, some 
scholars rely on  the two-prong test in Katz v. Untied States to argue that 
a person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy over his 
identity.422 Under Katz, a violation of the Fourth Amendment only occurs 
when it can be shown that a subjective expectation of privacy is present, 
and that expectation is one that society acknowledges as being objectively 
reasonable.423 The first prong of this test is satisfied because although 
people may expose their facial characteristics to the public, they often do 
not volunteer identifying information. The second prong is also fulfilled 
because the Supreme Court has made it clear that an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable if it is “established by general social norms.”424 
Polls reveal that 60% of Americans feel that they should be able to be out 
in public without being identified and 93% believe that they should be 
able to control who obtains information about them, so it is not hard to 
 
420. United States v.  Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
421. Id. at 282. 
422. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967). 
423. Id. at 361. 
424. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981). 
42
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/2
72 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
categorize privacy over our identity as a social norm.425 
The capabilities of the technology itself and the fact that FRT is not in 
general circulation can be used to argue that the use of FRT constitutes a 
search. For instance, in Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court 
determined that law enforcement officials had performed an unlawful 
search when they relied upon thermal imaging technology not available 
for use by the general public to gather information about the inside of a 
house.426 Similarly, FRT can only be used by law enforcement and large 
companies capable of compiling a database of pictures.427 It could even 
be argued that FRT is used to view the bone structure underneath our skin 
“since that is what facial recognition software can essentially do: create a 
digital wireframe, or skeleton, of a person’s face.”428  
 While Kyllo addressed information-gathering technology that could 
have only been obtained through a physical intrusion, the Supreme Court 
has also addressed technology that gathers publicly available information. 
In United States v. Jones, Justice Alito suggested that a GPS device does 
more than augment the senses, since it allows law enforcement to do 
things that would otherwise be impracticable.429 Although law 
enforcement could have followed the defendant, doing so for a month 
would have been costly, difficult, and impractical.430 Similarly in 
Carpenter v. United States, the Court described the collection of cell-site 
location information as inescapable and automatic because, unlike a nosy 
neighbor, GPS devices “are ever alert, and their memory is nearly 
infallible.”431  
These cases suggest that the Court could find that FRT, unlike the 
beeper that signaled the presence of an automobile to a police receiver in 
Knotts, does more than augment “the sensory faculties bestowed upon 
them at birth.”432 
 
425. Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Places: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Against the 
Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1613 (2017).  
426. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
427. With 350 million pictures being uploaded into Facebook and 95 million pictures being 
uploaded into Instagram every day, these platforms have access to over 290 billion pictures. Sean 
O’ Hagan, What Next for Photography in the Age of Instagram, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2018/oct/14/future-photography-in-the-age-of-
instagram-essay-sean-o-hagan. 
428. Elizabeth Snyder, “Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial 
Recognition Technology to Conduct Unlawful Searches, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 268 (2018).  
429. Elizabeth E. John, Artificial Intelligence and Policing: Hints in the Carpenter Decision, 16 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 281, 287 (2018). 
430. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that 
this type of surveillance would have required several agents, multiple vehicles, and aerial assistance, 
which are resources that would have been reserved for cases of unusual importance). 
431. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
432. United States v.  Knotts, 460 U.S. 282-83 (1983). 
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 3. First Amendment Concerns with FRT 
There is also disagreement as to whether FRT may infringe on a 
person’s First Amendment rights. In Laird v. Tatum, Vietnam War 
protestors argued that the government disregarded their First Amendment 
rights when Army surveillance tracked those who attended public 
meetings and kept a record of those who spoke.433 The Supreme Court 
held that no valid claim had been presented since the government’s 
surveillance did not have a deterrent effect.434 The Court explained that 
the protestors’ claim was based on the existence of the government’s data-
gathering system, and the Court refused to recognize that a deterrent 
effect could arise “merely from the individual’s knowledge that a 
governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the 
individual’s concomitant fear that . . . the agency might in the future take 
some other and additional action detrimental to that individual.”435 Laird, 
therefore, suggests that using FRT to identify those in attendance at public 
events does not raise any First Amendment concerns. 
However, some cases suggest that anonymity is a necessary safeguard 
to guarantee freedom of speech and association. For instance, in NAACP 
v. Alabama, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”) refused to comply with a court order directing it to 
produce, among other things, a list of its members.436 The Supreme Court 
recognized that there is a vital relationship between privacy and the 
freedom to associate, and therefore found that the court order would 
restrain the right of NAACP members to exercise such freedom.437 The 
Court explained that complying with the court order could result in 
members withdrawing and dissuade others from joining out of fear that 
their beliefs would be exposed.438  
Similarly, in Talley v. California, the Court found that an ordinance  
prohibiting the distribution of handbills unless they included the name and 
address of the person distributing them restricted freedom of 
expression.439 The Court explained that persecuted groups have used 
anonymity to criticize oppressive practices and laws, and “identification 
and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussion of public 
matters of importance.”440 
Talley and NAACP  provide the basis for arguing that FRT infringes on 
 
433. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 6 (1972). 
434. Id. at 11. 
435. Id. 
436. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958). 
437. Id. at 462. 
438. Id. at 463. 
439. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
440. Id. at 64-65. 
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a person’s First Amendment rights. When FRT is combined with other 
forms of technology, it  identifies individuals in attendance at protests, 
political rallies and religious ceremonies in real-time.441 This would 
discourage attendance by those critical of the government and those who 
hold unpopular opinions out of fear that they will be identified and be 
subject to negative repercussions. After all, people tend to alter their 
behavior when they know or suspect that they are being watched.442 
Although FRT technology is being employed by law enforcement to carry 
out important responsibilities, it could come at the high cost of self-
censorship.  
 4. Lower Court Cases Involving FRT  
There are several lower court cases in which FRT played some role in 
the litigation. The earliest ruling allowing the use of facial recognition 
evidence occurred in San Francisco in 2011.443 The case involved a 
defendant who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty-
five years in jail. The trial judge allowed the biometric proof  to be 
admitted as evidence, which  helped to exonerate the accused. The impact 
of FRT in this case surprised many legal professionals since the 
technology  is still novel.444    
Facial recognition software was used to help identify a criminal 
defendant  when the  video recording of an assault was posted on 
Facebook. In the case of In re the Interest of K.M., A Minor, the defendant 
contended that his conviction for aggravated assault and conspiracy was 
improper because he was only a bystander to the incident.445 The evidence 
demonstrated that the victim was walking home from school when he was 
confronted by the defendant and his accomplices. The defendant filmed 
the encounter between the victim and his co-conspirators in which the 
student was punched and kicked for no reason.446 The video was then 
posted on YouTube and the police identified the defendant through facial 
recognition software on Facebook. The suspect was arrested and his 
 
441. In 2016, nine out of thirty-eight body-worn-camera manufacturers had incorporated facial 
recognition technology into their units or were contemplating it. Katelyn Ringrose, Law 
Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates 
Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 60 (2019). 
442. See Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RES. CENTER 4 (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/D54F-G343 (noting that after learning about NSA surveillance from Edward 
Snowden’s revelation, 22% of America adults changed their online behavior). 
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phone, which was seized under a warrant,  contained the video of the 
fight.447 The court upheld the identification and properly adjudged the 
juvenile delinquent since his phone's camera was running before the 
assault.  The running camera  suggested that the attack was planned and 
that the parties were working together moments before the assault, 
thereby creating the inference that they agreed that one or more of them 
would  participate in the confrontation.448  
Geiger v. Maryland involved theft by deception.449 The facts show that 
a tire store employee received a call from a Brian Johnson requesting tires 
for his car. The next day, Johnson went to the store and orally provided 
his credit card number, since he claimed that he did not have the card with 
him.450 As an additional measure of identification, he produced a North 
Carolina driver’s license that contained his picture. It turned out that the 
credit card was stolen, and the driver’s license was fake.451  Johnson’s 
picture from the license was run through a database and facial recognition 
software matched it to a Maryland driver’s license. The judge was shown 
both pictures at trial, and the court determined that they showed the same 
man.452 
During the testimony of the investigating detective, the state offered 
into evidence a copy of the Maryland picture that was located though 
FRT. The defense vigorously protested the picture’s introduction but the 
trial judge ruled that the defendant “doesn’t have a right to protect his 
image,” and it was defense counsel who mentioned facial recognition 
technology in the first place.453 The court opined that no error had been 
committed because the computerized identification was not being used as 
evidence but was simply a guide used by the detective to put the  
investigation ”on the right track.”454 At no time did the detective testify 
in any manner about FRT and the state never questioned him about facial 
profiling.455 Therefore, when utilized to direct the investigation, the use 
of FRT technology did not invalidate the defendant’s conviction.456 
In United States v. Gibson, the defendant secured a Florida driver’s 
license under the false name of Gregory Gibson.457 He then applied for a 
 
447. Id. 
448. Id. at 6.  
449. Geiger v. Maryland, 174 A.3d 954, 956 (Md. 2017). 
450. Id. at 956. 
451. Id. at 957. 
452. Id. 
453. Id. at 964. 
454. Id. at 965. 
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457. United States v. Gibson, No. 8:00-CR-442-T-27AEP, 2016 WL 845272, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 
4, 2016). 
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passport and submitted a false application under the fictitious name. The 
application was flagged as fraudulent and the authorities tried to locate 
the defendant to no avail.458 Several years later, an analyst conducted a 
facial recognition check and linked the fake picture to the driver’s license 
of Anthony Lazzara. This individual was arrested at the address listed on 
the valid license.459 A subsequent fingerprint search revealed a host of 
aliases and a criminal record linked to the defendant.460  
The defendant objected to the time delay between when he submitted 
the false passport application and his trial.461 His motion to dismiss the 
case as a violation of the right to a speedy trial, however, was denied. The 
court noted that the defendant caused the delay by using various aliases 
and false identifications.462 This deception thwarted his apprehension 
through traditional investigative tools such as the fingerprint database. 
The agent further stated that he did not have initial access to FRT because 
of privacy concerns.463 Therefore, any delay on the part of the government 
was considered a slight negligence at the worst and the defendant did not 
suffer any prejudice.464 
Montanez v. Department of Transportation involves a suspension of a 
driver’s license in Pennsylvania.  In Montanez, facial recognition 
software determined that the defendant had obtained a driver's license 
using a false identity.465 The driver had received multiple citations over a 
period of time from 2006 to 2010 under the name of DeLeon. He used the 
name Montanez to obtain a different license in 2013 as well as a 
commercial driver’s license in 2016. In 2017, Montanez renewed his 
driver's license and the Department of Transportation used facial 
recognition software to compare driver's license pictures to others in the 
government’s database.466 At this time, the Department of Transportation 
learned that DeLeon and Montanez were the same person. While the court 
never discussed the use of FRT, it upheld the suspension of the license 
because of the fraud perpetrated by the defendant—which necessarily 
rested on the use of FRT.467  
In the case of In re Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland, 
two individuals were suspected of engaging in extortion via Facebook 
 
458. Id. at *2. 
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461. Id. at *1. 
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463. Id. at *3. 
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Messenger.468 The Government sought to seize the electronic devices 
located at  the suspects’ residence, and the court found that the facts in the 
affidavit supported a finding of probable cause.469 However, the 
Government also sought to compel any individuals located at the 
residence to use their biometric features (such as a fingerprint or a facial 
scan) to unlock the electronic devices to search their contents.470 The 
Court found that this subsequent request violated the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.471 
The Court reached this conclusion by first noting that courts have 
previously held that suspects cannot be compelled to provide the passcode 
for an electronic device.472 The Court recognized that while some acts 
could qualify as testimonial “if conceding the existence, possession, and 
control, and authenticity of the documents tended to incriminate them,” 
other acts such as providing a blood sample or a fingerprint did not 
constitute a communication.473 The Court finally concluded that 
compelling the use of biometric features to unlock a device was not akin 
to compelling someone to submit to fingerprinting or provide a DNA 
sample for two reasons.474 First, biometric features in these types of cases 
serve the same purpose as a passcode, so if a person cannot be compelled 
to provide his or her passcode the person cannot be compelled to use their 
biometric features.475 Second, while compelling someone to submit to 
fingerprinting merely confirms whether he or she is the source of physical 
evidence,476 compelling someone to use biometric features to unlock a 
device confirms ownership or control of the device as well as control or 
significant connection to its contents.477 
FRT has also been addressed in civil suits against private entities. In 
Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc, several individuals sued Shutterfly for 
collecting and using their facial geometry without their consent in 
 
468. In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2019).  
469. Id. 
470. Id. 
471. See id. at 1013-14 (explaining that the court also found that the Government’s request violated 
the Fourth Amendment because it was not limited to a particular person or device and the 
Government could not be allowed to search a non-suspect’s device simply because they are present 
during a lawful search). 
472. Id. at 1015 (“The expression of the content of an individual’s mind falls squarely within the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
473. Id.  
474. Id. 
475. Id. at 1015-16. 
476. Id. at 1016. 
477. See id. (“With a touch of a finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has accessed the phone 
before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint password capabilities, and that he or she currently 
has some level of control over or relatively significant connection to the phone and its contents.”). 
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violation of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).478 
Shutterfly moved to dismiss the complaint by claiming that BIPA did not 
cover facial geometry obtained from photos and that plaintiffs failed to 
allege actual damages.479  Guided by the statutory definitions, the court 
concluded that a facial scan did not constitute “biometric information,”480 
but did constitute a “biometric identifier.”481 The court explained that a 
facial scan was referenced in the definition of “biometric identifier,”482 
and limiting these scans to those obtained in person was not supported by 
the statute’s purpose of “protecting privacy in the face of emerging 
biometric technology.”483 As for Shutterfly’s second claim, the court 
found that BIPA does not require a showing of actual damages to state a 
claim.484 The court reached this conclusion by noting that other statutes 
have been interpreted to allow recovery without a showing of actual 
damages.485 
In Patel v. Facebook, Inc. several website users filed suit against 
Facebook, claiming that the social media giant used facial-recognition 
technology without complying with BIPA.486 The  case involves 
Facebook’s feature known as “Tag Suggestions”. If activated, Facebook 
may use FRT to ascertain whether the customer’s friends are contained in 
pictures uploaded by that user. If a picture is downloaded, FRT will scan 
the image to see if it includes any faces of known people.487 If  known 
people are present in the image, the software detects the geometric data 
points that generate a face signature or a map. The software then compares 
the face signature to other images in the company’s database of user face 
templates. If a match is found, Facebook informs the user to tag the person 
in the picture.488  
Facebook filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing 
because the plaintiffs had not claimed any identifiable injury. This motion 
was denied and an appeal was taken of that determination.489 In upholding 
this decision, and certifying the matter as a class action, the 9th Circuit 
found that “an invasion of an individual's biometric privacy rights has a 
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close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”490 Once 
Facebook creates a face template of that person, the potential uses are 
endless. The company can use the information to tag the user in the 
hundreds of millions of photos uploaded to Facebook each day and 
identify whether the person’s Facebook friends are also present in the 
picture.491 According to the court, Facebook's assemblage, use, and 
storage of customer’s facial templates is the very harm contemplated by 
the statute.492 Facebook appealed this adverse ruling to the Supreme 
Court, but  the Court denied certiorari .493  
On January 30, 2020, Facebook  settled this claim for $550 million,  
marking one of the largest settlements ever made in a privacy lawsuit.494 
Paul Geller--one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs-- admitted he 
was “hopeful that this case is a turning point for privacy litigation. 
Technology is advancing at a rapid pace, and corporations need to realize 
that they better tread carefully when it comes to recognizing, tracking and 
monitoring us.”495 
Google is currently facing a similar lawsuit in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California.  The complaint alleges that Google 
violated BIPA by collecting biometric identifiers through its photo-
sharing cloud service without written consent from users.496 Specifically, 
the complaint states that Google used FRT to create face templates and 
that “each face template that Google extracts is unique to a particular 
individual, in the same way that a fingerprint or voiceprint uniquely 
identifies one and only one person.”497 The suit seeks $5,000 for each 
BIPA violation and an injunction to stop Google from continuing this 
practice.498 
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   5. Court Cases involving FRT in Other Countries   
The struggle over the use of FRT is not limited to the United States. A 
British court recently found that the use of FRT by police is lawful, 
thwarting the efforts to limit FRT by an activist  concerned about the 
tool’s implications for privacy.499 The opinion was decided while a 
worldwide debate concerning the growing use of FRT was taking 
place.500 Advances in artificial intelligence have made it simpler for law 
enforcement to automatically scan faces and promptly match those 
images to "watch lists" of suspects, missing people and those of interest, 
but the technology also presents apprehension about mass surveillance.501 
The Plaintiff in the British case claimed that the police scanned his face 
twice as it assessed the technology. The first instance occurred while he 
was Christmas shopping and the second when he was at a protest.502  The 
plaintiff asserted that “[t]his sinister technology undermines our privacy 
and I will continue to fight against its unlawful use to ensure our rights 
are protected and we are free from disproportionate government 
surveillance."503 The court disagreed, stating that the use of facial 
recognition technology by the police was consistent with British human 
rights and data privacy laws because the images and biometric data of 
those who were not a match on the "watch list" were promptly deleted.504 
The court did note, however, that its legal analysis should be periodically 
reviewed.505 
In Canada, the Ontario Court of Justice considered a case involving 
facial recognition technology in R. v. Voong.506 The defendant was 
arrested after FRT identified him as having seven fraudulent driver’s 
licenses in the Ministry of Transport database.507 In the past, three of these 
license cardholders had failed to appear in court for traffic violations so 
the Crown had charged Mr. Voong for possession of fraudulent driver’s 
license possession under the Canadian Highway Traffic Act.508 The 
defendant asserted that the evidence was obtained through an 
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unreasonable search according to the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.509 
The Ontario Court of Justice disagreed and noted that the Charter did 
not apply to pictures and materials provided with the driver’s license 
application since there were no relevant privacy considerations.510  The 
Ministry of Transport has the authority to disclose information in its files 
to other agencies. Therefore, the defendant has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy and his rights were not violated.511  
One Russian court has rejected a claim to ban FRT.512 A woman, Alena 
Popova, was involved in a sexual harassment protest in Moscow in 2018. 
Subsequently, she was fined for protesting after  being identified through 
FRT.513 This government action prompted her to sue the Moscow police 
claiming that they were “indiscriminately” collecting biometric 
information through facial recognition software without consent.514 The 
court dismissed the claim. The police maintained that Popova had no 
proof that FRT was used to identify her.515 It should be noted that this 
case comes at a time that Moscow is planning to expand its use of FRT as 
its mounts 160,000 cameras around the city, making it one of the largest 
users of FRT in the world.516 This move has prompted objections by 
several organizations. For instance, Amnesty International has criticized 
the plan to expand the utilization of facial-recognition systems, saying 
their anticipated use in Moscow during public assemblies will “inevitably 
have a chilling effect” on protesters.517 
Chinese courts were asked to address FRT use for the first time just last 
year. A Chinese law professor sued a wildlife park after being required to 
scan his face to enter the park.518 The law professor was an annual pass-
holder who learned that the park had replaced its fingerprint identification 
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refused to undergo a facial scan were not allowed into the park and were 
not reimbursed for the value of their membership.520 According to the 
lawsuit, this violated China’s consumer protection law since it forced 
customers to provide biometric information without their consent.521 
Although the law professor is seeking a refund for his membership, he 
claims to have filed the lawsuit primarily to “raise awareness about the 
problems that come from the unregulated collection of personal data and 
to call for increased regulation and compliance.”522  
China does not have laws regulating the collection, storage, and use of 
information gathered through FRT despite being one of the biggest users 
of this technology.523 The Chinese government is known to support 
companies that develop FRT to bolster commerce and ensure public 
safety.524 FRT is widely used in Chinese airports, railway stations, offices, 
campuses and residential buildings.525 China  also uses the technology to 
arrest jaywalkers and those who commit other summary offenses.526 
Although there was a “public willingness to surrender some privacy in 
exchange for the safety and convenience,” concerns have risen after it was 
reported that facial data was being sold online for as little as $1.40.527 A 
new law requiring phone service providers to scan the faces of new 
customers has also led some to speculate that the government is using 
FRT to keep track of its population.528 Many are now calling for a ban on 
FRT use, and the outcome of this lawsuit could lead the government to 
devise laws that regulate how private companies and law enforcement use 
the technology.529 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article aims to show the extent to which law enforcement relies 
upon recent developments in camera surveillance, automated license plate 
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Unfortunately, laws regulating these various forms of technology have 
not been able to keep pace with developments, and law enforcement has 
been able to utilize digital advances with few restrictions. Although this 
technology offers a vast array of benefits, it is important to be mindful 
that these digital developments may infringe on the Constitutional rights 
of citizens. Some state legislatures and lower courts have taken steps to 
safeguard or minimize this intrusion, but the degree to which the civil 
liberties of citizens are protected should not depend upon the state in 
which they live. Rather than waiting for the Supreme Court to resolve the 
various constitutional issues raised by this new technology, Congress 
should enact legislation that ensures the use of these digital advancements 
is limited, transparent, and accurate. These systems are only going to 
become more sophisticated over time and the government will be able to 
monitor the minute-by-minute movements of its citizens with relative 
ease. Therefore, safeguards need to be implemented so that members of 
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